The first refreshable anonymous token scheme proposed in [1] enables one to provide services in such a way that each of its users is allowed to enjoy only a fixed number of services at the same time. In this paper, we show that the scheme in [1] is insecure and propose a provably secure refreshable partial anonymous token scheme which is a generalization of the previous scheme. The new scheme has an additional ability to control the anonymity level of users. We also propose a formal model and security requirements of the new scheme.
required is rental systems in public libraries. The simple application of an e-cash system in [5] or the k-times anonymous authentication scheme in [4] does not solve this problem. This is because the former scheme requires issuing of a new blind signature every time users return borrowed books, which threatens their anonymity. The latter scheme restricts only the total number of times that users are allowed to enjoy services. A public library allows users to borrow as many books as they want as long as the number is within a certain limit.
To solve this problem, a refreshable anonymous token scheme was first introduced in [1] . This scheme enables a manager of a system to receive a token from a user and issue a new token to that user. This procedure can be repeated as many times as the user wants to in such a way that no one except the user is able to link the new token and the old token. We call this process refreshing. Moreover, this scheme enables the manager to trace the actual user if the user uses a token more than once without refreshing it. When this scheme is applied to a rental system in a public library, the library accepts a token every time a user borrows a book and issues a new refreshed token to the user when the user returns the book.
Although the refreshable anonymous token scheme proposed in [1] seemed to be a good solution to the problem mentioned above, the paper [1] has a number of defects:
(1) its model is unclear, (2) its security requirements are not clear, and moreover (3) the proposed scheme is not secure at all. In fact, users are able to refresh their tokens so that no one is able to trace the users even if they maliciously use the tokens more than once.
The refreshable anonymous token scheme has another problem as well. It requires managers to keep all the records of tokens it received from the users so that it can trace malicious users when they overuse their tokens. However, this forces managers to spend vast amounts of computational and storage resources, which makes application of this scheme impractical.
In this paper, we propose a formal model, security requirements, and a specific provably secure scheme of refreshable partially anonymous token schemes. Refreshable partially anonymous token schemes are generalization of refreshable anonymous token schemes in which users and the manager are able to include a piece of non-blinded information in tokens. This information can be revised when refreshing.
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Our scheme is based on the restrictive partially blind signature scheme (RPBS) proposed in [7] . This signature scheme allows a user to receive, from a signer, a signature to a message that is linked to the user's identity. However, given these messages and signatures, no one, including the signer, is able to reveal the identity to which this message is linked. This message can also contain a piece of nonblinded information that is agreed to by the user and the signer. In our scheme, users obtain a pair of a restrictive partially blind signature and the corresponding message from the manager as a new token, which is linked to the old token that the user sent to the manager. Then, no one is able to link the new token to the old one. Although refreshing tokens is almost nothing but an application of a simple restrictive partially blind signature, introduction of this procedure dramatically solves the problem.
Our scheme uses the partial knowledge release protocol proposed in [8] in presenting a token to the manager. This enables the manager to identify a user who presented the same token more than once. Moreover, if we include information such as an expire date in the non-blinded part of the messages, the manager is no longer required to keep all the records of the tokens it received, but only those of the unexpired tokens. The security of our scheme directly depends on that of the restrictive partially blind signature proposed in [7] .
Our scheme can be applied to a large number of systems such as anonymous rental service, download control system, anonymous currency exchange system, and anonymous prescription system. These systems often impose limitations on the number of services each user can enjoy simultaneously.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of refreshable anonymous tokens, and points out the problems of the previous scheme. Section 3 makes a list of our contributions. Section 4 describes the building blocks of our scheme. Section 5 defines a model and security requirements of refreshable partially anonymous token schemes. Section 6 proposes our refreshable partially anonymous token scheme. Section 7 gives example applications of our scheme. Section 8 concludes our paper.
Previous Works

Refreshable Anonymous Token
A refreshable anonymous token scheme was first introduced in [1] . Players in this scheme are token issue manager I and users. A user U in the scheme can obtain token from I which U can use only once. The user is also able to refresh this token to a new one which is unlinkable to it. We give an overview of the scheme in the following.
A manager I first generates his public key rpkey by running an algorithm RT-Setup. Next, each user U generates its identifier ridty by running an algorithm RT-KeyGen and registers it via protocol RT-Register to the manager. These are the system setup procedures.
Next, a user interacts with the manager via a protocol RT-Issue to obtain a refreshable token rtokn and the corresponding secret rtkey from the manager. In this protocol, the manager blindly issues (rtokn,rtkey) to the user so that the manager cannot link rtokn to ridty even if the manager obtained rtokn after the protocol. However, from a pair of rtokn and rtkey, the corresponding ridty can be revealed. Since valid rtokn cannot be generated without the help of the manager, only users who are allowed by the manager are able to obtain a value rtokn.
Next, by showing rtokn and proving the knowledge, via RT-Authenticate, of the corresponding rtkey, the user is able to enjoy a service that the manager provides. Here, the user proves the knowledge of rtkey by partial knowledge release protocol proposed in [8] . This enables the manager to identify the ridty that rtokn is linked to if the user engaged to RT-Authenticate with respect to the same rtokn for more than once.
Once the user finished enjoying the service, user is able to refresh (rtokn, rtkey) to a new (rtokn , rtkey ) via RTRefresh protocol. In this protocol, the manager blindly issues a new (rtokn , rtkey ) to the user so that it cannot link the new rtokn to the old rtokn even if it obtained the new rtokn after the protocol. However, a pair of (rtokn rtkey ) is still linked to ridty. Therefore, again, the user is not able to use this new token for more than once.
As the result, such a scheme allows the number of services each of users is able to enjoy at once to be only within the number of tokens that the manager issued to this user. But the scheme does not impose limitation on the total number of times each of users can enjoy services. Any of e-cash systems [9] - [11] , k-times anonymous authentication schemes [4] , and group signature schemes [12] , [13] could not solve such a problem.
Problems in the Previous Scheme
The refreshable anonymous token scheme proposed in [1] has a number of weakness. The most serious one is a defect that this scheme is not secure at all.
In this scheme, there are elements of the form (g a , g b ) in tokens such that the product ab is related the identity of the corresponding user. Through a refreshing protocol, the user obtains a new token that includes elements (g a , g b ) such that a b = ab. This is done by using restrictive blind signature scheme. However, the basing restrictive blind signature allows the user to obtain not only (g a , g b ) but also (g a s , g b s ) with any s. Hence, the relation a b = ab no longer holds if the user maliciously generated the new token with s 1. This defect allows users to use the same token as many times as they want to without being traced.
Another weakness is that absolute unlinkability of tokens forces managers of scheme to keep all the history of authentications of users. This is necessary since a malicious user may use a token which was used a long time ago. Without these histories, the manager is not able to identify malicious users. Since the history data tends to be large if the scheme is carried out for long period of time, the computational cost for the manager to verify each token also grows to huge amount.
The paper [1] gave only ambiguous model and security requirements of the refreshable anonymous token scheme, which is another weakness.
Our Contribution
In this paper we propose a secure refreshable partially anonymous token scheme which is a generalization of the previous scheme. Our scheme uses the token that includes elements (g a , g b ) such that a/b, instead of ab, is related to the identity of the corresponding user. Through a refreshing protocol, the user obtains a new token that includes elements (g a , g b ) such that a /b = a/b. This is done by using restrictive blind signature scheme as in the previous scheme. In this case, malicious users are able to obtain (g a s , g b s ) with any s. However, since (a s)/(b s) = a /b = a/b for any s, such an attack is no more effective. Hence, the defect of the previous scheme is repaired.
Unlike in the previous scheme, tokens in the new scheme contain a piece of unblindable information that is agreed by the user and the manager. This commonly agreed information is effective in a number of purposes.
1. We are able to indicate the expiring date of tokens. This allows the manager to discard the authentication history of expired tokens. This saves storage and computational cost for preventing the double usages of tokens. 2. We are able to indicate denomination of tokens. Without agreed information, we need to run different refreshable anonymous token scheme for each denomination. 3. We are able to temporarily violate unlinkability of a token. When a user refreshes a token, the manager and the user can agree to assign a unique number to the agreed information so that it is easy for any one to trace this user. When it became unnecessary to be linked, the user is able to refresh its token to a new one with non unique agreed information. This functionality is effective for applications such as an anonymous prescription history management system in which the links between prescriptions are partially disclosed to supply vital information needed to avoid dangerous combination of medicine.
We believe such an improvement to the previous scheme greatly enlarge the number of its applications. For the sake of introduction of such a piece of unblindable information, we exploited partially restrictive blind signature scheme rather than simple restrictive blind signature scheme. The former is a generalization of the latter. We also propose a formal model and security requirements of refreshable partially anonymous token schemes. It should be noted that these scheme include refreshable anonymous token schemes. Our proposed scheme is the first scheme, even as a simple refreshable anonymous token scheme, that is provably secure.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce notation and building blocks of our proposed scheme.
Notation
Let k be a security parameter and q be a prime of length k, G q be a multiplicative cyclic group of order q, g be its generator. We assume that the decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G q is difficult to solve. Let F : {0, 1} * → G q and H be cryptographic hash functions that are considered to be instantiations of random oracles.
Representation
Representation problem is to find a representation of h with respect to (g 1 , . . . g k ).
It can be easily shown that, if the discrete logarithm problem in G q is difficult to solve, finding a representation of randomly chosen h with respect to randomly chosen (g 1 , . . . g k ) ∈ G k q is also difficult. ZAKR protocol is a special honest verifier zeroknowledge argument of knowledge of representation that has special soundness property. The protocol is given in the following:
Definition 3: Zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of representation (a 1 , . . . , a k ) of h with respect to (g 1 , . . . , g k ) (ZAKR protocol) is as in the following. Here, P is a prover and V is a verifier.
Common input to a prover P and a verifier
2. V randomly chooses c ∈ Z/qZ and sends it to P.
PKR protocol is a partial knowledge release protocol introduced in [8] . The protocol is given in the following:
Definition 4: Partial knowledge release (PKT) protocol of representation (a 1 , . . . , a k ) of h with respect to (g 1 , . . . , g k ) using h is as in the following. Here, P is a prover and V is a verifier. Common input to a prover P and a verifier
1. V randomly chooses c ∈ Z/qZ and sends it to P.
This protocol has two important properties. A view of the protocol for randomly chosen h does not help to find the representation of h with respect to (g 1 , . . . , g k ). From two views for different c, it is easy to find the representation of h with respect to (g 1 , . . . , g k ).
The former property follows from the fact that partial knowledge release protocol is the only a part of ZAKR protocol. While, in ZAKR protocol, the randomly chosen h is given to V in the middle of its protocol, in PKR protocol, it is given to V before the protocol begins. The latter property follows from the special soundness property of the above ZAKR protocol.
A Restrictive Partially Blind Signature
The main component of our scheme is the restrictive partially blind signature proposed by Maitland et al. in [7] . The scheme is an extension of the partially blind signature scheme proposed by Abe et al. in [14] , to which the restrictive property proposed by Brands in [5] is included. The scheme of Abe et al. is provably secure in the random oracle model and is the scheme of Maitland et al. While many of these schemes are only provably secure in the generic group model † . In restrictive partially blind signature scheme, a recipient of signature first registers its identifier idty to a signer. Next, the signer and the recipient agree to some common information info. Next, via blindly signing protocol B-Sign, the signer blindly issues a blinded signature bsig to a blinded message bmsg to the recipient. This bmsg is linked to the recipient's identifier idty, but no one including the signer is able to link (bmsg, bsig) to idty. However, if the recipient execute a partial knowledge release protocol with respect to the same (bmsg, bsig) for more than once, the signer is able to link (bmsg, bsig) to idty. The model of respective partially blind signature in [7] did not consider this partial knowledge release protocol. However, since the restrictiveness has significance only when such a protocol is considered, we include it in the model.
Definition 5:
Players in Restrictive blind signature scheme are a signer S, a recipient R, and a verifier V. This scheme consists of three algorithms: (Setup, KeyGen, Trace) and three interactive protocols, (Register, B-Sign, Authenticate). In the original scheme of Maitland et al., Register is included in B-Sign. Also, KeyGen, partial knowledge release protocol in Authenticate, and Trace are out of scope.
Setup: A probabilistic algorithm for S that, given a security parameter k, randomly chooses x 1 ∈ Z/qZ and (g, g 1 , g 2 ) ∈ (G q ) 3 , generates y 1 = g x 1 , and output signing key sigk = x 1 and public key pkey = (g,
KeyGen: A probabilistic algorithm for R that, given public key pkey = (g, g 1 , g 2 , y 1 ), randomly chooses recipient secret key skey = t 1 ∈ Z/qZ, generates recipient identifier idty = I = g 1 t 1 , and outputs (skey, idty).
(skey, idty) = (t 1 , I) ← KeyGen(pkey)
Register: An interactive protocol between S and R. S and R are given pkey of S and idty of R, S is additionally given its sigk and a list list, and R is additionally given its skey. In the protocol, R proves to S the knowledge of the representation t 1 of I with respect to g 1 by the ZAKR protocol. If S accepts R, S outputs acc and adds idty of R to list. Otherwise rejects R and outputs rej.
∅, (acc/rej, list) ← Register R(pkey, idty, skey), S(pkey, idty, sigk, list)
B-Sign: An interactive protocol between S and R. S and R are given pkey, idty of R, and common agreed information info. S is additionally given its sigk and list. R is additionally given its skey.
1. S checks whether or not idty is in list. If it is, S outputs acc and continue; otherwise, it outputs rej and stops. 2. S randomly chooses r 1 , c 2 , s 2 ∈ R Z/qZ and generates
and generates
Then R sends c to S. 4. S randomly chooses c 1 ∈ R Z/qZ, and generates
hold. If they do, R generates
is secure only when the number of signatures issued is logarithm of its security parameter, or is secure when it is provided with the compiler proposed in [15] and the signature issuing protocols are executed only in an asynchoronized parallel way. † † We are also able to use an elliptic curve to make the scheme efficient.
R outputs a tuple of a blinded message, a blinded signature, and blinded secret key (bmsg, bsig, bskey) (z , c 1 , c 2 , s 1 , s 2 ), (w 1 , w 2 ) ), acc/rej ← B-Sign R(pkey, idty, info, skey), S(pkey, idty, info, sigk, list)
Authenticate: An interactive protocol between R and V. R and V are given pkey, bmsg, bsig, and common agreed information info. R is additionally given bskey. First, V verifies if the equation
holds. If the above equation holds, we say V(pkey, bmsg, bsig, info) = acc. Next, R proves the knowledge of representation bskey of bmsg with respect to (g 1 , g 2 ) using PKR protocol using m . If if V accepts, it keeps the history hist of this interaction and outputs acc; otherwise outputs rej.
∅, (acc/rej, hist) ← Authenticate R(pkey, bmsg, bsig, info, bskey), V(pkey, bmsg, bsig, info)
Trace: An algorithm for S that, given pkey, bmsg, bsig, info, list, and two histories hist 1 and hist 2 of Authentication with respect to the same (bmsg, bsig), it recovers bskey = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 ). This is done by using the property of the PKR protocol. Then, it generates
and find the same I in list. Finally, it outputs I. I ← Trace(pkey, bmsg, bsig, info, list, hist 1 , hist 2 )
Security Requirements for the Restrictive Partially Blind Signature
As security requirements for RPB-signature schemes, Maitland et al. adopted four notions in [7] . They are a combination of ordinary completeness, restrictiveness of restrictive blind signature schemes introduced by Brands in [5] , and unforgeability and partial blindness of partially blind signature schemes introduced by Abe et al. in [14] . These notions, which are slightly modified according to the modification of the scheme, are given in the following. A signature scheme is partially blind if, for every constant c > 0, there exists a bound k 0 such that for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S * , S * outputs b = b with probability at most 1/2 + 1/k c for k > k 0 . The probability is taken over the coin flips of KeyGen R 0 , R 1 , and S * .
Definition 8: Unforgeability Let S be an honest signer that follows the B-Sign protocol. Let R * play the following game in the presence of an independent umpire.
(state, idty) ← R * (pkey). 3. The umpire randomly choose info s and places (pkey, idty, info s , sigk, list), and a randomly taken on the input tapes of S. 4. R * engages in the B-Sign protocol with S in a concurrent and interleaving way. Here, input to S is set every time by the umpire and R * as in the following.
• (state, info s ) ← R * (state).
• The umpire places (pkey, idty, info s , sigk, list), and a random tape on the input tapes of S. bsig 1 ) , . . . , (bmsg s +1 , bsig s +1 ). A partially blind signature scheme is unforgeable if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm R * that plays the above game, the probability that the output of R * satisfies V(pkey, info s , bmsg j , bsig j ) = acc for all j = 1, . . . , s + 1 is at most 1/k c where k > k 0 for some bound k 0 and some constant c > 0. The probability is taken over the coin flips of Setup, S and R * . The following definition of a restrictive blind signature is due to Brands [5] . The blinding-invariant functions BI 1 and BI 2 in the above restrictive partially blind signature scheme is such that BI 1 = BI 2 : (Z/qZ) 2 → Z/qZ; (a 1 , a 2 ) → a 1 /a 2 . Instead of some modifications to the scheme and to the security requirements, the above restrictive partially blind signature scheme is complete, partially blind, and unforgeable.
Refreshable Anonymous Tokens
We now present a formal model and security requirements of refreshable partially anonymous token schemes.
Model
Refreshable anonymous token scheme consists of three algorithms (RT-Setup, RT-KeyGen, RT-Trace) and four interactive protocols (RT-Register, RT-Issue, RT-Authenticate, RT-Refresh). Players in the schemes are a manager I, a user U, and a verifier V.
RT-Setup: An probabilistic algorithm for I that, given a security parameter k, outputs signing key rsigk and public key rpkey.
(rsigk, rpkey) ← RT-Setup(1 k )
RT-KeyGen: An probabilistic algorithm for U that, given rpkey, outputs secret key rskey and identifier ridty.
(rskey, ridty) ← RT-KeyGen(rpkey) 
Security Requirements
The security requirements for refreshable partially anonymous token scheme that we proposed are very similar to those for restrictive partially blind signature scheme. However, those for our scheme has two major differences. The first one is that, in our scheme, I (corresponding to S) issues a new token rtokn (corresponding to bmsg, bsig) from an old rtokn (corresponding to a (bmsg, bsig)) as well as from identifier ridty (corresponding to idty). The second one is that includes traceability of malicious users, which comes from partial knowledge release protocol in RT-Authenticate (corresponding to an Authenticate).
Definition 10: Completeness If I and U honestly follow the protocols, the following relations hold with an overwhelming probability: Definition 11: Partial Anonymity Let U 0 and U 1 be two honest users and I * play the following game in the presence of an independent umpire.
(state, rpkey)
* (rpkey, state). 4 . The umpire secretly selects b ∈ R {0, 1}. 5. I * engages in the RT-Issue protocol and RT-Refresh protocol (for any i) with U 0 and U 1 in a parallel and arbitrarily interleaved fashion. If any of protocols fails to complete, the game is aborted. Here, inputs to U 0 and U 1 are set by the umpire as in the following. The umpire do the following everywhen necessary:
• The umpire inputs (rpkey, ridty b , rinfo U 0 , rskey b ), and (rpkey, ridty 1−b , rinfo U 1 , rskey 1−b ), respectively, to U 0 and U 1 when they engage in REIssue.
• The umpire inputs (rpkey, rtokn A signature scheme is partially anonymous if, for every constant c > 0, there exists a bound k 0 such that for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm I * , I * outputs b = b with probability at most 1/2 + 1/k c for k > k 0 . The probability is taken over the coin flips of RT-KeyGen U 0 , U 1 , and I * .
Definition 12: Unforgeability Let I be an honest signer that follows the RT-Issue and RT-Refresh protocols. Let U * play the following game in the presence of an independent umpire.
* engages in the RT-Issue and RT-Refresh protocols with S in a concurrent and interleaving way. For each rinfo s , let s be the sum of the number of executions of RT-issue protocol and that of RT-Refresh protocol where S outputs completed and rinfo s is on its output tapes. (For rinfo s that has never appeared on the output tape of S, define s = 0.) Here, inputs to U 0 and U 1 are set by the umpire as in the following. The umpire do the following everywhen necessary:
• (state, rinfo s ) ← U * (state).
• The umpire inputs (rpkey, ridty, rinfo s , rsigk, rlist) and a random tape to I when it engages in RE-Issue.
• The umpire inputs (rpkey, rtokn (i) , rinfo s , rsigk) and a random tape to I when it engages in RERefresh. Here rtokn (i) is given from U * .
4. U * outputs a single piece of common information, info s , and s + 1 refreshable tokens ((rtokn 1 , rtkey 1 ) , . . . , (rtokn s +1 , rtkey s +1 )). A refreshable partially anonymous token scheme is unforgeable if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm U * that plays the above game, the probability that the output of U * satisfies
for all i = 1, . . . , s + 1 is at most 1/k c where k > k 0 for some bound k 0 and some constant c > 0. The probability is taken over the coin flips of Setup, I and U * . . . . , g k ).
Definition 13: Traceability
If S accepts R in RT-Authenticate only when R did not execute partial knowledge release protocol of representation of (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ rtkey of input ridty/rtokn with respect to a generator-tuple (g 1 , . . . , g k ), the RT-Authenticate is said to be partially releasing. A refreshable partially anonymous token scheme is said to be traceable if it is restrictive and its RT-Authenticate is partially releasing.
It is clear that if a scheme is traceable, double usage of a token release the knowledge of rtkey which can be lined to ridty. Hence, malicious user can be identified.
Relation between RPB-Signature Scheme and Refreshable Partially Anonymous Token Scheme
Suppose that we consider the following correspondences: Then, it seems that the refreshable partially anonymous token scheme can be easily constructed from RPB-signature scheme. However, this is possible only when the underlying RPB-signature has a such a special feature that the a tuple {(bmsg, bsig), bskey} is also able to be used as {idty, skey}.
It is easy to see that such a feature is not general by considering the following artificial RPB-signature scheme. Suppose we are given one RPB-signature scheme. We modify it so that its recipient is able to obtain {(bmsg, bsig), bskey} only when it has two independent {idty 1 , skey 1 } and {idty 2 , skey 2 }. Here, the recipient is required the knowledge of both skey 1 and skey 2 but it consequently obtains only one {(bmsg, bsig), bskey} which corresponds to either {idty 1 , skey 1 } or {idty 2 , skey 2 }. Because of degeneracy of recipient's knowledge shown above, this artificial scheme is not suitable for our scheme.
Although such a feature is not a general one, fortunately, we are able to find several RPB-signature schemes that can be modified to have such a feature. An example is the Maitland's scheme in [7] . Thus, we propose a refreshable partially anonymous token scheme by modifying Maitland's scheme in the next section. This modification is novel.
Proposed Refreshable Anonymous Token Scheme
The Scheme
Our refreshable partially anonymous token can be constructed using restrictive partially blind signature. The crucial difference is that our scheme has RT-Refresh protocol.
RT-Setup:
The same as Setup except that we replace (S, sigk, pkey), respectively, with (I,rsigk,rpkey). RT-KeyGen: The same as KeyGen except that we replace (R, pkey, skey, idty), respectively, with (U, rpkey, rskey, ridty). RT-Register: The same as Register except that we replace (S, R, pkey, idty, skey, sigk, list), respectively, with (I, U, rpkey, ridty, rskey, rsigk, rlist). RT-Issue: The same as Blindly-Sign except that we replace (S, R, pkey, idty, info, skey, sigk, list, (bmsg, bsig), bskey), respectively, with (I, U, rpkey, ridty, rinfo, rskey, rsigk, rlist, rtokn, rtkey). Note that, in RT-Issue, the concatenation of bmsg and bsig is called as rtokn. RT-Authenticate: The same as Authenticate except that we replace (S, R, pkey, (bmsg, bsig), info, bskey, hist), respectively, with (I, U, rpkey, rtokn, rinfo, rtkey, rhist). Note that, in RT-Issue, the concatenation of bmsg and bsig is called as rtokn. RT-Refresh: Suppose that U is given m = g 1w 1 g 2w 2 in rtokn. The rest RT-Refresh is the same as RT-Issue except that U and I use m instead of m, that U uses (w 1 ,w 2 ) instead of rskey = t 1 , and that U assigns w 2 =w 2 α 1 instead of α 1 . RT-Trace: The same as Trace except that we replace (S, pkey, (bmsg, bsig), info, list, hist 1 , hist 2 ), respectively, with (I,rpkey,rtokn,rinfo, rlist, rhist 1 , rhist 2 ). Note that, in RT-Issue, the concatenation of bmsg and bsig is called as rtokn.
Security of the Proposed Scheme
Theorem 1: The proposed scheme has unforgeability property.
Proof 1:
It is clear from unforgeability of the underlying restrictive partially blind signature.
Theorem 2:
The proposed scheme has partial anonymous property.
Proof 2:
It is clear from partial blindness of the underlying restrictive partially blind signature.
Theorem 3:
The proposed scheme has traceable property with respect to the following blinding-invariant function:
Proof 3: It is clear from restrictiveness of the underlying restrictive partially blind signature our scheme is restrictive. It is also clear that RT-Authenticate in our scheme is partially releasing from the property of the partial knowledge release protocol used in RT-Authenticate. Therefore, our scheme is traceable.
Applications
In the recent upsurge of electronic information society, there are increasing needs for preserving privacy of service users.
To meet such needs, many cryptographic technique that provide services while preserving anonymity of their users have been developed. However, by these technique, service providers are unable to monitor states of their users because of their anonymity. Hence, it is difficult for service providers to control their services depending on the state of each users.
For example, without identifying each user, it is difficult for the service provider to limit the number of services that each user can enjoy at once, i.e., to decide whether or not it will additionally provide a service to the user according to the amount of services that the user is already enjoying. We often encounter such a difficulty in many cases such as when we need to limit the capacity of lines each user can use at once, when we limit the number of books that each user can borrow at once from a library, etc.
The technique of "refreshing" that we exploited in our scheme is quiet effective for solving the aforementioned general problem. We give several examples to which applications of our scheme are especially effective.
• Rental Service: An application of our scheme is suitable for a rental services such as the one a public library or a rental video shop. In this application, each user is able to anonymously borrow one book by presenting one token. If the user returns the book he borrowed, the user will obtain a new "refreshed" token for borrowing another book. Hence, the number of books that each user can keep at once is limited by the number of tokens it has. Since new tokens cannot be linked to the old ones, the library is unable to trace the user's personal history with respect to books the user has borrowed. Moreover, expiring data can be included in disclosed information rinfo of token.
• Download Control: An application of our scheme can also be suitable for controlling capacity of lines each user can use at once such as the one in online video delivery service. In this application, a user is able to anonymously download video contents by presenting a token. The number of contents that the user can download at once is limited by the number of token it has. Such a limitation enable service providers to maintain the quality of their services. When the user finished downloading the contents, the user is able to obtain a new "refreshed" token. Since this new token cannot be linked to the old token, the service provider is unable to trace the user's personal history. The period of time of contract and the type of contract can be included in disclosed information rinfo part of refreshable partially anonymous token.
• Currency Exchange: An application of our scheme is suitable for an electronic cash system that provides foreign currency exchange service. Consider the case where the user exchanges one currency to another currency. If the currency is anonymous, then new currency must include, without compromising unlinkability, the same identifier as the old one so that doubly spent ones are traceable. The technique of refreshing in our scheme is certainly suitable for solving such a problem. Moreover, the face value of the currency can easily be incised by rinfo.
• Anonymous Prescription History Management: A nice application of our scheme can be found in anonymous prescription history management system in which the links between prescriptions are partially disclosed to supply vital information needed to avoid dangerous combination of medicine. Since taking a medicines in combination with other medicines may be dangerous, the pharmacies are required to know the recently prescribed medicines of their patients. Hence, selected data of prescription must be linked to its previous ones while keeping other data private. Partial anonymity of our scheme is suitable for solving such a problem. Note that the disclosed data can be selected dynamically in our scheme.
• Anonymous Survey: An anonymous and periodical survey system is another application of our scheme. With our scheme, the survey system is able to allow its respondents to anonymously respond only once in each period. For example, the surveyor of TV-audience-rating want to receive the rating data of each user exactly once for each month. We are able use our refreshable token scheme for such a purpose in the following way: The surveyor issues to each user a refreshable token that includes the month data in rinfo and refreshes it only when user could present a refreshable token whose rinfo indicates the last month. Then, the surveyor is able to prevent users from responding more than once in each month and is able to give refreshed tokens to only users who presented that of the last month. Since only users who had responded every month is able to obtain the last token, the surveyor is able to accuse lazy users.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed new notion of refreshable partially anonymous token schemes which is generalizations of refreshable anonymous token schemes. We have proposed its formal model, security requirements, and a specific scheme that is provably secure in the random oracle model. We also showed that the previous scheme is insecure. Hence, our proposed scheme is the first secure scheme as a refreshable anonymous token scheme as well. 
